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Irreparably Corrupt and
Permanently Incorrigible:
Georgia’s Procedures for
Sentencing Children to Die in
Prison*
I. INTRODUCTION
Right now, two teenagers live in Georgia prisons, knowing they will be
incarcerated for the rest of their lives. 1 Countless adults are serving
sentences of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for crimes they,
too, committed when they were teenagers. It is difficult to find in
officially-reported data adults serving sentences they received for crimes
they committed while children. This is because, once the two teenagers
specifically noted in the Georgia Department of Corrections’ Inmate
Statistical Profile 2 turn twenty, they will move to the next data bracket
for imprisoned people between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine, just
as all the adults before them have. 3 There is no readily-attainable public
record of how many people in that row and beyond have been in prison
since they were teenagers. People like that simply fade into anonymity—
unless an appeal from their conviction is significant enough to result in
a published opinion by the Georgia Court of Appeals or Georgia Supreme
Court.
This is the case for Dakota White and Dantazias Raines. Since being
sentenced to serve their lives in prison, both have aged from teenagers
into young adults. They no longer occupy the first row of the page four
* I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dean Sarah Gerwig-Moore, and student
writing editor, Sandy Davis, for their feedback and encouragement during the writing
process. I am also deeply grateful to my wife, Heather Ness-Maddox, for her patience with
me throughout law school and especially the writing of this Article.
1 GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE STATISTICAL PROFILE: ACTIVE LIFE
WITHOUT
PAROLE
at
4
(2020),
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/sites/all/themes/gdc/pdf/Profile_life_wo_parole_2020_10.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
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table in the Inmate Statistical Profile but have instead grown into the
next bracket for young adults sentenced to LWOP. Unlike most of the
other 225 young men on that row, White and Raines have made
long-lasting marks on Georgia’s juvenile criminal procedure via their
appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court. In those cases, in January 2020
and July 2020, the Georgia Supreme Court established rules and
published decisions ensuring that White 4 and Raines 5 will stay in prison
forever.
Surely White and Raines (and the two anonymous teenagers the
Department of Corrections acknowledges in the Inmate Statistical
Profile) deserve to live and die in prison, though. They must represent the
worst of young criminals in Georgia. Of course our criminal justice
system is designed to ensure that only “the rarest of juvenile
offenders . . . whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” are
sentenced as they were. 6 Well, sort of. This Article examines the
procedures that the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Georgia require for the State to permanently imprison
individuals based on convictions they received for crimes committed
while minors.
Currently, the State must prove a child is “irreparabl[y] corrupt[]”
before he can be sentenced to serve his life in prison. 7 At face value, this
appears to be a strict standard. It must mean that only the most violent
minors, those who cannot be expected to grow beyond their apparent
depravity, will never hope for a life outside of prison. This Article
analyzes that standard—how it came into existence, how it has been
interpreted federally and at the state level, and what the immediate
outcomes have been—to determine its true functionality.
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
United States Constitution 8 in ways that significantly limit the State’s
ability to punish juveniles for criminal actions. First, the Court
interpreted the Eighth Amendment 9 to mean defendants could not be
sentenced to death for crimes committed under the age of sixteen. 10 Then,
the Court expanded that ruling to mean individuals could not be
sentenced to death for crimes they committed when they were under the

4 See White v. State, 307 Ga. 601, 608, 837 S.E.2d 838, 846 (2020) (affirming White’s
sentence to serve life in prison without the possibility of parol).
5 Raines v. State, 309 Ga. 258, 273, 845 S.E.2d 613, 624 (2020) (affirming the sentencing
judge’s denial of Raines’s request to be sentenced by a jury).
6 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
7 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).
8 U.S CONST.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
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age of eighteen. 11 More recently, the Court ruled that homicide is the only
crime for which people under the age of eighteen may be sentenced to life
without parole. 12
A few years later, the Court narrowed that rule even more. Now, when
LWOP is on the table, sentencing entities must make specific
determinations to decide whether a defendant is eligible to serve life
without the possibility of parole for a crime committed while a child. 13
White and Raines, both seventeen when they committed their respective
crimes, were sentenced under the most recent iteration of that test. 14
Most of this Article focuses on more recent rulings on juvenile LWOP
sentencing, first tracking federal Supreme Court precedent to the Court’s
current stance, then reviewing Georgia Supreme Court precedent based
on those decisions. The second portion of this Article analyzes White v.
State 15 and Raines v. State, 16 the Georgia Supreme Court’s most recent
decisions regarding juvenile LWOP. This analysis exposes several
procedural gaps through which defendants may fall and thus be more
easily sentenced to spend their entire adult lives in prison. Specifically,
the Georgia Supreme Court’s rulings in White and Raines indicate a
pattern through which sentencing laws designed for children tend to
expand beyond their originally intended meaning.
The final third of this Article critiques the appropriateness of the
current standards for sentencing children to live in prison and offers
feasible alternatives to juvenile LWOP. The Article ultimately concludes
that juvenile life without parole must either be abolished entirely, as the
Georgia General Assembly could easily do, or must be regulated by the
legislature so the procedures to meet the irreparable corruption standard
function uniformly and comply with modern understandings of juvenile
psychology.
II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON JUVENILE
SENTENCING
A. Abolition of Juvenile Death Penalty as Groundwork for Juvenile
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
13 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (referencing what later became the “irreparable corruption”
standard and requiring sentencing entities “to take into account how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.”).
14 White, 307 Ga. at 608, 837 S.E.2d at 846 (affirming White’s sentence); Raines, 309 Ga.
at 273, 845 S.E.2d at 624 (remanding Raines’ case for him to be sentenced by the judge who
originally sentenced him to LWOP.).
15 White v. State, 307 Ga. 601, 837 S.E.2d 838 (2020).
16 Raines v. State, 309 Ga. 258, 845 S.E.2d 613 (2020).
11
12
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LWOP Litigation
Before discussing the issue of juveniles serving life without parole, an
overview of death sentencing for juvenile is in order. In 1988—not even
forty years ago—the Supreme Court determined that executing children
under the age of sixteen “would offend civilized standards of decency” and
was unconstitutional. 17
Almost thirty years later, in 2005, the Court decided Roper v.
Simmons 18 and held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 19
forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
age of [eighteen] when their crimes were committed.” 20 This holding
hinged on combined constitutional and psychological theories that
reappeared in later juvenile LWOP decisions. First, the Court noted that
any logic behind the death penalty relies on a finding of extreme
culpability, and even the most criminally-minded teenager is often too
immature to develop that level of responsibility. 21 Along the lines of
culpability, the Court discussed how children are psychologically
underdeveloped, noting that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists
to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects . . .
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” 22 For these reasons, the Eighth Amendment
bars the execution of individuals for crimes committed under the age of
eighteen. 23
Given the psychological deficiencies juveniles have by virtue of being
children, the Court determined that permitting the execution of minors
constituted “disproportionate punishment” for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment and, thus, was unconstitutional. 24 That holding rested on
the theory that the Constitution bars punishment for those who cannot
be reasonably held accountable for all their actions. 25 The Court also
noted that the United States was a significant outlier in international
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830, 838.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
21 Id. at 572–73.
22 Id. at 573. Though the term “irreparable corruption” later developed into a label
necessary to punish a child with LWOP, it was used in this context to denote the level of
depravity necessary to justify a death sentence. As is discussed in more detail later in this
Article, the Court compared the finding of “irreparable corruption” to a diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder—a diagnosis psychiatrists cannot give patients under
eighteen because children have not developed enough to make the permanent diagnosis
worth the risk of burdening a future, functional adult. Id. at 573–74.
23 Id. at 578.
24 Id. at 575.
25 Id. at 573.
17
18
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law by permitting the execution of those convicted while minors. 26 In
short, the Court introduced a new interpretation of the Constitution that
complied with modern understandings of proportionality and juvenile
psychology, resulting in the United States refusing to “stand[] alone in a
world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.” 27
B. Juvenile LWOP litigation Post-Roper
1. Irreparably Corrupt: The Miller v. Alabama Standard
Before 2005, the major issue in juvenile justice was the death penalty.
It was only after Roper that litigation in federal courts regarding juvenile
life without parole began in earnest. From the beginning of juvenile
LWOP litigation, courts have relied on death penalty jurisprudence in
determining whether a life sentence is appropriate. Graham v. Florida 28
was the first major Supreme Court decision regarding juvenile LWOP
post-Roper. In that 2010 case, the Court held that children cannot be
sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes other than homicide. 29 Relying
on the same psychology-based logic as in Roper, the Court noted that the
theory of retribution simply does not apply to child offenders because
children cannot develop the “personal culpability” necessary to render
life without parole proportional to the offender’s responsibility. 30
Furthermore, because LWOP is permanent and the most extreme
sentence a juvenile may receive, the Court determined LWOP is for
juveniles what the death penalty is for adults: the ultimate punishment
that must be approached with extreme caution. 31
After limiting juvenile LWOP to defendants convicted of homicide, the
Court in Miller v. Alabama 32 determined that states cannot make life
sentences for children mandatory by statute. 33 In reaching that decision,
the Court relied on the Graham logic that a life sentence for a child is
analogous to death sentence for an adult, both in terms of the sentence’s
permanence and the findings required to satisfy the Constitution before
Id. at 575.
Id. at 577. The Court cited multiple international treaties, various countries’ statutes,
and other countries’ disavowing of the juvenile death penalty as evidence that the United
States was, essentially, behind-the-times in the cruelest way. Id. at 576.
28 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
29 Id. at 82.
30 Id. at 71 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) and Roper, 543 U.S. at
571). The Court implied it would not favor minor offenders in the future by assuring the
public that “[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions on a juvenile nonhomicide
offender to express its condemnation . . . .” Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
31 Id. at 78.
32 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
33 Id. at 489.
26
27
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imposing the sentence. 34 Referring back to the concepts of culpability and
juvenile psychology that influenced the holdings in Graham and Roper,
the Court stated that sentencers cannot impose “a State’s most severe
penalties on juvenile offenders . . . as though they were not children.” 35
Because death cannot be a mandatory sentence for adults, 36 and because
children are unique within the criminal justice system, sentencers must
be able to consider the child offender’s personality, personal situation,
and the circumstances of the crime before rendering a sentence
“analogous to capital punishment.” 37
The Court’s core reasoning was that “mandatory penalties, by their
nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and
the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” 38 Under
a mandatory life without parole scheme, a seventeen-year-old from a
functional family would be treated the same as a fourteen-year-old from
an abusive background—and both teenagers would be sentenced just like
an adult would be in their position. 39 For those reasons, the Court decided
that a sentencer “must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for
juveniles.” 40 Specifically, the Court referred to its prior decision in Roper
to argue that sentencers must have the ability to examine evidence and
distinguish offenses that reflect “transient immaturity” from those that
“reflect[] irreparable corruption.” 41
The Court declined to detail exactly how sentencers should decide
which children are irreparably corrupt and which are deeply immature
and thoughtless; it left state and lower federal courts to iron out those
details. The Court was careful to note that a sentencer may well conclude
the defendant is indeed corrupt beyond repair and thus deserving of
dying in prison. 42 The juvenile simply cannot be sentenced without an
examination of his particular circumstances because, as with the death
penalty, mandatory imposition of the most severe punishment
constitutionally available “g[ives] no significance to ‘the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances’ of the
Id. at 474–75.
Id. at 474.
36 Id. at 475 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
37 Id. at 475–77 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 89 (Roberts, C.J. concurring)).
38 Id. at 476.
39 Id. at 477.
40 Id. at 489.
41 Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
42 Id. at 479 (“[W]e do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles . . . .
But . . . we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible
penalty will be uncommon.”).
34
35

2020]

IRREPARABLY CORRUPT

477

offense . . . .” 43 As it had in its prior cases regarding children and the
death penalty, the Court rested much of its decision on the determination
that children are “constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.” 44
Four justices dissented from the Miller majority opinion. 45
Significantly, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by justices Thomas, Alito, and
Scalia, objected on the grounds that mandatory life without parole could
not be a “cruel and unusual punishment” for children because it was not
“unusual” enough. 46 The Chief Justice warned that by making it more
difficult to sentence juveniles to life without parole, minors could have
their LWOP sentences overturned. 47 Chief Justice Roberts predicted that
over time the trend away from juvenile LWOP would make juvenile life
without parole so uncommon that, eventually, “the Court will have
bootstrapped its way to declaring that the Eighth Amendment absolutely
prohibits [juvenile LWOP].” 48 Four years later, the Court clarified the
scope of Miller and applied it more broadly than the opinion originally
indicated, paving the way for Chief Justice Roberts’s fears to be realized.
2. The Scope of Miller
In 2016, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 49 the Court determined that the
Miller rule applied retroactively, meaning that prisoners whose
sentences were finalized before the Court decided Miller could attack
their sentences through habeas corpus and potentially have their
sentences reduced. 50 The Court focused on the Miller holding that
sentencers must have the option to review a juvenile’s history before
sentencing him to life in prison and specified that courts must determine
whether a child is one of the “rare[]” irreparably corrupt minors for whom
life without parole is proportionate to his crime. 51

Id. at 475 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
Id. at 471.
45 Id. at 493. This Article focuses on Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent because it highlights
the developing nature of extreme sentences for juveniles, but Justices Thomas and Alito
wrote additional dissents. Justice Thomas lamented that Roper and Graham were wrongly
decided. Id. at 502 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Alito took issue with the Court’s
treatment of seventeen-year-olds as legal minors and the trend of ruling state laws
unconstitutional due to “evolving standards of decency.” Id. at 510 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
46 Id. at 493 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
47 Id. at 501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48 Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
49 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
50 Id. at 736.
51 Id. at 726.
43
44
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As it had in Miller, the Court led readers through the primary theories
of punishment and explained why sentencing juveniles to serve their
lives in prison does not serve any of those theories particularly well, just
as exposing minor defendants to the death penalty served limited
functional purposes. 52 Though states are entitled to punish people for
purely retributive reasons, “the case for retribution is not as strong with
a minor as with an adult” because children usually cannot be as culpable
for their crimes as their adult counterparts. 53 Likewise, the deterrence of
future crimes barely applies to juvenile offenders because, just as
children cannot experience culpability in the same way as adults, they
are far less likely to consider the repercussions of their actions. 54
Permanently incapacitating minors via imprisonment is similarly
ineffective because children who commit even the most brutal crimes
have yet to develop mentally, so they are less likely to be dangerous to
society in the future after having the opportunity to mature. 55
Rehabilitation, the final primary theory of punishment, does not apply to
LWOP in any case, not just for children, because “life without parole
‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal’” in its permanence. 56
The Court in Montgomery did not just repeat its theories in Miller; it
highlighted that Miller “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional
penalty for ‘a class of defendants’”—the class of juveniles “whose crimes
reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” 57 The Miller decision, then,
did not represent merely a prophylactic rule for the future; it rendered
unconstitutional all convictions in violation of Miller, no matter how long
ago the prisoners’ direct appeals ended. 58 Again, the Court did not bar
life without parole for juvenile offenders across the board; it just required
that Miller’s constitutional rule be applied retroactively, and
acknowledged the limited functionality of sentencing children to serve
life without parole.
Id. at 733.
Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).
54 Id. (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).
55 Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).
56 Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 473).
57 Id. at 734 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). This point is
particularly interesting because, as the dissenting justices pointed out, the Court in Miller
clearly stated: “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
offenders . . . .” Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483).
58 Id. The Court relied heavily on the retroactivity analysis and test outlined in Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). Under Teague, most imprisoned people do
not benefit from new rules of criminal procedure established after a sentence is finalized.
Id. at 306–07. However, individuals in prison may collaterally attack their sentences
(usually via habeas proceedings) based on “new substantive and watershed procedural
rules.” Montgomery, 136 U.S. at 728. “Miller announced a new substantive rule of
constitutional law” that state courts must apply retroactively. Id. at 734.
52
53
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As they had in Miller, justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito objected to
the majority ruling. 59 Most of the dissent focused on legal and policy
reasons backing prior Supreme Court decisions on retroactively applying
new rules in criminal law, but Justice Scalia also alleged that the
majority was invested in reducing the number of juveniles serving life
sentences rather than ruling strictly based on precedent. 60 Chief Justice
Roberts joined in the majority opinion, but Justice Scalia’s complaint
about the results of the Montgomery decision furthered the Chief
Justice’s earlier theory that the Court was intentionally moving to a
future where juvenile LWOP will be barred entirely.
3. Veal v. State: A Foundational Georgia Supreme Court
Interpretation of Miller and Montgomery
The Supreme Court’s retroactive application of Miller in Montgomery
directly affected post-conviction proceedings in Georgia. In 2016, the
Georgia Supreme Court interpreted those United States Supreme Court
rulings in a way that was, at first glance, relatively strict and favorable
to juvenile defendants. In Veal v. State (Veal I), 61 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the Miller rule meant that, not only must a sentencer
consider the factual circumstances surrounding a case when sentencing
a child to LWOP, but the sentencer must specifically “determine[] that
[the defendant] is irreparably corrupt.” 62
However, the court held that the minor defendant’s sentence “turns
not on” the specific facts of the defendant’s circumstances. 63 Rather, the
sentence hinges on the “specific determination” regarding the
defendant’s irreparable corruption. 64 Considering the child’s “age and
perhaps some of its associated characteristics” combined with the
circumstances of the crime itself will not do; the sentencer must
determine that the child is irreparably corrupt, impossible to
rehabilitate, and thus deserving of LWOP. 65 Because the trial court in
Veal initially determined the defendant deserved life without parole, but

59 Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts did not publish an opinion
regarding his decision to join the majority, and he did not reiterate his complaints regarding
the decision in Miller.
60 Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting the majority did “nothing more than
express the reason why the new, youth-protective procedure described by Miller is
desirable: to deter life sentences for certain juvenile offenders.”) (emphasis in original).
61 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).
62 Id. at 702, 784 S.E.2d at 411 (emphasis in original).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 703, 784 S.E.2d at 412.
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did not brand him as irreparably corrupt, the supreme court remanded
the case for an irreparable corruption determination. 66
On remand, the government did not attempt to convince the trial court
that Veal was in fact irreparably corrupt. Instead, the prosecutor
changed the requested sentence to multiple life sentences with the
possibility of parole, to be served consecutively, in addition to several
other life sentences with the possibility of parole. Veal’s combined
sentences totaled “eight consecutive life sentences plus [sixty] years.” 67
These life sentences carried the possibility of parole, but per O.C.G.A.
§ 42-9-39(c), 68 prisoners like Veal must serve sixty years of multiple life
sentences before becoming parole-eligible. All this amounted to a
requirement that Veal live in prison until he was well into his seventies—
several years beyond his statistical life expectancy—without a sentencer
ever determining him irreparably corrupt. Just as before, the trial court
imposed this new sentence without determining Veal was
irredeemable. 69
On appeal, Veal claimed his multiple consecutive sentences amounted
to de facto LWOP without the determination necessary to satisfy the
requirements the Georgia Supreme Court outlined in 2016. 70 But his
constitutional claim was to no avail. In its second hearing of Veal v. State
(Veal II), 71 the state supreme court ruled that because Veal was not
sentenced to LWOP per se, the functionality of his sentence was of no
constitutional concern. 72 Under the court’s reading of Miller and
Montgomery, the two cases “create[ed] a substantive rule” that applies
specifically and exclusively to LWOP per se because that sentence is
based on a single crime. 73 Because the court’s understanding of Miller
and Montgomery hinged on the narrow circumstance of courts doling out
life without parole based on a single crime, rather than multiple life
Id.
Veal v. State, 303 Ga. 18, 18, 810 S.E.2d 127, 128 (2018) (Veal II).
68 O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39(c) (2020).
69 Veal II, 303 Ga. at 19, 810 S.E.2d at 128.
70 Id.
71 Veal v. State, 303 Ga. 18, 810 S.E.2d 127 (2018).
72 Id. at 20, 810 S.E.2d at 129. (“Because the Supreme Court has not expanded its
mandate that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as it
applies to juvenile offenders requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile’s youth and its
attendant characteristics before imposing a sentence other than LWOP, this Court will not
do so.”).
73 Id. at 19, 810 S.E.2d at 128–29. “[N]either Miller nor Montgomery addressed the
imposition of aggregate life-with-parole sentences for multiple convictions or whether
sentences other than LWOP require a specific determination that the sentence is
appropriate given the offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics . . . .” despite the
defendant’s argument that the court’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent “elevates
form over substance.” Id.
66
67
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sentences based on multiple crimes, the latter option fell outside explicit
Supreme Court precedent and thus the defendant was not entitled to that
precedent’s protections. 74
In the eyes of the Georgia Supreme Court, then, the fact that a child
would be forced to live in prison his entire life was not at the core of the
United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller. 75 All that mattered
was the technical sentence in relation to one crime, not the real-life
fallout of sentencing children to suffer identical consequences for
multiple simultaneous crimes 76—despite the United States Supreme
Court’s explicit statement that children cannot be sentenced to die in
prison “as though they [are] not children.” 77
In Veal II, the court determined that whether a child is irreparably
corrupt “turns not on the sentencing court’s consideration of his age and
the qualities that accompany youth along with all of the other
circumstances of the given case . . . .” 78 The court reached this surprising
conclusion despite the Miller Court stating, and the Georgia Supreme
Court later understanding, that sentencing entities “must have the
discretion to consider ‘youth and its attendant characteristics, along with
the nature of [the defendant’s] crime . . . .’” 79 In short, in Miller the
United States Supreme Court required that sentencers consider things
such as age, maturity, and the circumstances of the crime in determining
whether a child is irreparably corrupt. 80 Then, the Georgia Supreme
Court interpreted Miller to mean that judges must deem a child
irreparably corrupt without “turn[ing] . . . on” the child’s age; “the
qualities that accompany youth”; and the circumstances of the case. 81
This essentially turned Miller inside-out, divorcing its primary holding
(a requirement of irreparable corruption) from the factors that establish
the existence of irreparable corruption and teeing up the State of Georgia
for ongoing litigation regarding the procedures required to sentence
children to live and die in prison.
III. WHITE V. STATE: THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT DECLINES TO
Id. at 20, 810 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. at 19, 810 S.E.2d at 128–29.
76 Id.
77 Miller, 567 U.S. at 474.
78 White v. State, 307 Ga. 601, 604, 837 S.E.2d 838, 843 (quoting Veal I, 298 Ga. at 702,
298 Ga. at 411) (clarifying the holding in Veal I).
79 Id. at 604, 837 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465).
80 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80. The Court requires sentencers “to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison” so only those who are irreparably corrupt will be sentenced to
LWOP. Id.
81 Veal I, 298 Ga. at 702, 784 S.E.2d at 411.
74
75
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EXTEND MILLER AND MONTGOMERY TO THEIR LOGICAL ENDS
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 2016, the same year the Georgia Supreme Court published its
decision in Veal I, seventeen-year-old Dakota White and a friend entered
a suicide pact. Before dying, however, White and his friend wanted to
know what it felt like to kill someone else. To accomplish this part of their
plan, the two boys set out to kill White’s other friend, Samuel, partially
“because he would be an ‘easy’ victim.” 82 White and his friend killed
Samuel, but they fell short of the “suicide” part of their plan. In short
order, White was arrested and charged with Samuel’s murder. 83
White was charged, tried, and convicted of malice murder. A judge
sentenced him to serve his life in prison without the possibility of parole
with an additional ten years for the lesser crimes with which he was
charged. 84 In determining White was “irreparably corrupt,” the
sentencing judge noted the circumstances of the crime: the planning
White and his co-conspirator put into the crime, the details of the
homicide itself, and White’s “reckless and impulsive behavior” despite an
apparently normal home environment. 85
White’s sentencing judge discredited an expert’s conclusion that White
was not “irretrievably depraved” because the judge believed the opinion
did not rely on credible evidence and was “based on predictions that
‘simply cannot be made.’” 86 The judge then sentenced White to life
without the possibility of parole based on the premise that White was
permanently depraved, a conclusion the judge reached by a
preponderance of the evidence. 87
White, 307 Ga. at 601, 837 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting the record on appeal).
Id. at 601–02, 837 S.E.2d at 841.
84 Id. at 602, 837 S.E.2d at 841. White was also convicted of concealing the death of
another and tampering with evidence. Id.
85 Id. at 605, 837 S.E.2d at 843.
86 Id. Herein lies one of the many issues regarding juvenile LWOP sentencing. One
problem with the irreparable corruption standard will always remain true: declaring a child
irrevocably corrupt or, in the alternative, not irrevocably corrupt requires adults to
speculate wildly about a child’s certain future. It is true that the conclusion that a child can
eventually be rehabilitated broaches on fortunetelling, but so does the conclusion that a
child cannot be rehabilitated—that is, that a child is irrevocably corrupt and beyond help,
even decades in the future. So, while an expert’s determining White to be redeemable was
speculative, the judge found the opposite to be permanently true and sentenced White to
life without the possibility of parole. Id. The sentencing judge (and the reviewing court, for
that matter) failed to at least acknowledge the absurdity of dismissing the expert’s
recommendation on the basis that the defendant could not prove he would not commit
crimes in the future while accepting the State’s premise that the defendant certainly would
commit those future crimes.
87 Id. at 604, 837 S.E.2d at 843.
82
83
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B. The Supreme Court Holds Sentencers Need Only Decide a Child is
More Likely Than not Irreparably Corrupt
On appeal, White’s counsel argued that the State should have to prove
defendants irreparably corrupt beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a
preponderance of the evidence, for the judge to make the determination
and sentence White to life without parole. 88 In January 2020, the Georgia
Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s findings for clear error and
holdings de novo. 89 In White v. State, the court upheld the determination
that White was irreparably corrupt under a preponderance standard and
did not require that conclusion to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 90
Instead of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to sentence a
juvenile to life in prison, the court noted that the preponderance standard
in the sentencing process “generally satisfies due process.” 91 While that
is true, one must then ask whether sentencing a child to die in prison,
which the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledges should be “exceptionally
rare” 92 and only happen to “the worst-of-the-worst,” 93 falls in the
“general[]” category of situations where the preponderance standard is
appropriate. 94
The Georgia Supreme Court continued in this vein, highlighting the
fact that the irreparable corruption requirement is an outlier in juvenile
LWOP sentencing, not the trend-setter. 95 As a result, the court held there
88 Id. White’s counsel also argued that White’s arrest was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment and that, based on that constitutional infirmity, statements White
made while in police custody were improperly admitted at trial. Id. at 603, 837 S.E.2d at
842. Even though the supreme court “ha[d][] doubts” regarding the constitutionality of the
arrest itself, it ruled that White’s statements were admissible because the police did have
probable cause for the arrest (despite lacking a warrant). Id. This holding is unsurprising
since the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in situations where the arresting
officers had probable cause and pertinent information against the defendant provided by
other residents in his household. Id. However, it is yet another example of a general
procedural rule designed primarily for adult defendants that does not account for juveniles
being less capable of asserting their rights and remaining silent while in police custody
after an illegal arrest.
89 Id. at 602, 837 S.E.2d at 842.
90 Id. at 606, 837 S.E.2d at 844.
91 Id. at 605–06, 837 S.E.2d at 844 (quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156
(1997)).
92 Id. at 604, 837 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Veal I, 298 Ga. at 702, 784 S.E.2d at 411)
(emphasis in Veal I).
93 Veal I, 298 Ga. at 703, 784 S.E.2d at 412.
94 White, 307 Ga. at 606, 837 S.E.2d at 844 (quoting Watts, 519 U.S. at 156).
95 See id. at 605–06, 837 S.E.2d at 844 (Arguing that, though the irreparable corruption
test presents a particular issue for sentencers to determine, the irreparable corruption
determination may comply with the preponderance standard because the Supreme Court
has not explicitly made juvenile LWOP an exception to general rules outside the corruption
determination).
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was no reason to treat juvenile LWOP any more delicately than any other
sentencing scheme. 96 Thus, though sentencers must at least “have the
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstance before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles,” 97 there was no cause for the
court to read the unique requirements and repercussions of and for
juvenile LWOP in a way that “deviat[es] from the ordinary rule that proof
by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.” 98
The court noted that the Due Process Clause 99 does not “prohibit” a
given state criminal practice unless the practice “offends some principle
of justice . . . ranked as fundamental.” 100 Though true, this construction
is the narrowest possible interpretation of the issue and combines the
exceptional sentence of juvenile life without parole, and what is supposed
to be the exceptional circumstances of a crime that make LWOP possible,
with run-of-the-mill sentencing schemes for adults. Put another way,
though life without parole for minors should be “exceptionally rare” and
applied only to the worst juvenile offenders, those unique offenders are
not entitled to any procedural protections beyond what the Supreme
Court has made explicit to ensure the rarity of the sentence. 101 Rather,
the Georgia Supreme Court decided that, with the exception of the
irreparable corruption determination, juveniles being sentenced to the
harshest punishment possible are subject to procedures designed for
adults.
So, what makes a child irreparably corrupt and eligible to live in prison
for the rest of his life? Simply put, whatever convinces the sentencing
entity the child is more likely than not irredeemable. 102 And what must
the State prove under what was designed to be a strict requirement?
“[S]imply . . . that the evidence show[s] that something is more likely true
than not.” 103

Id. at 606, 837 S.E.2d at 844.
Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 489) (emphasis in White).
98 Id.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100 White, 307 Ga. at 605, 837 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
445 (1992)).
101 Id. at 604, 837 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Veal I, 298 Ga. at 702).
102 Id. at 606–07, 837 S.E.2d at 844–45. The supreme court asserted that the trial court
laid out detailed evidence to “support[] the trial court’s determination that White [was]
irreparably corrupt” but did not feel the need to discuss that evidence itself, despite White’s
claim that it was insufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at
607, 837 S.E.2d at 845. The trial court considered White’s testimony at his co-conspirator’s
trial, but it stated its decision regarding White’s character would be the same even without
that testimony. Id. at 608, 837 S.E.2d at 845.
103 Id. at 607, 837 S.E.2d at 845.
96
97
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IV. NO JURY REQUIRED: JUDGES, NOT ONLY JURIES, MAY SENTENCE
CHILDREN TO LWOP
In 2011, Dantazias Raines and his friend intended to commit an armed
robbery. Their plan went awry, and Raines fatally shot their robbery
victim. 104 In 2013, a jury convicted Raines of malice murder, and he was
sentenced to serve life without the possibility of parole. After a round of
direct appeals, Raines’s case was remanded with the instruction that he
be resentenced in compliance with Montgomery and Veal I. On remand,
the trial judge prepared to determine whether Raines was irreparably
corrupt and sentence him to serve life without parole. Raines objected
and requested to be sentenced by a jury. The judge denied his motion but
certified his request for an interlocutory appeal for the supreme court to
decide the issue. 105 In 2020, the supreme court held in Raines v. State
that judges, not necessarily juries, may sentence juvenile defendants like
Raines to life without parole. 106
Ultimately, the court held that defendants convicted of murders they
committed while minors are not entitled to a jury sentencing them to
LWOP because the “irreparably corrupt” determination is not an
additional finding of fact that increases an authorized sentence. 107 This
holding is particularly interesting given the court’s discussion that, when
a state requires a finding of an “aggravating circumstance” to sentence a
defendant to death, a jury must find that factor. 108 That is, when the law
requires a factual finding for adults to receive the ultimate, life-ending
sentence of death, a jury, not a sentencing judge, must make a factual
finding that an aggravating factor existed in the commission of the
murder. 109 The Georgia Supreme Court decided that because an
irreparable corruption determination is required by the Constitution, not
by Georgia statute, juveniles sentenced to this maximum available
punishment are not entitled to the same procedure as adults who receive
the maximum punishment available—despite the court’s reliance on law
regulating the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court’s direct
comparisons between the death penalty for adults and life without parole
for juveniles, and the historic relationship between juvenile death
penalty and juvenile LWOP. 110
104 Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 582–53, 820 S.E.2d 679, 682–83 (2018). The court also
handled various evidentiary concerns and ruled in favor of the State on almost all of them,
none of which rendered Raines ineligible for LWOP. Id. at 582, 820 S.E.2d at 682.
105 Raines v. State, 309 Ga. 258, 258–59, 845 S.E.2d 613, 615 (2020).
106 Id. at 273, 845 S.E.2d at 624.
107 Id. at 264, 845 S.E.2d at 618–19.
108 Id. at 6, 845 S.E.2d at 617 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)).
109 Id. (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
110 Id. at 265–66, 845 S.E.2d at 619–20.
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The court reached two major conclusions through its analysis: (1)
unlike the death penalty for adults, life without parole is not an enhanced
sentence for juveniles because life with the possibility of parole is not
always the statutory maximum sentence available for minors; and (2) the
Veal II irreparable corruption test is not a “fact” to be determined by a
jury. It is just a conclusion to be reached. 111
A. Procedural Safeguards for Enhanced Sentences and Statutory
Maximums do Not Protect Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole
For its conclusion that irreparable corruption is not a finding of fact
reserved for a jury, the supreme court relied on the general principle that
“no additional facts are required to be found by the jury for the imposition
of life without parole.” 112 But the case the court relied on for that
conclusion, Lewis v. State, 113 dealt only with adults sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole. 114 For an adult, there is no factfinding
necessary for an LWOP sentencing, but there is also no requirement that
a sentencer determine the defendant be irreparably corrupt. That is,
under a statute that also allows judges to sentence adult defendants to
death, adult defendants are not entitled to additional findings of fact to
be sentenced to LWOP. It is difficult to see how that relates to the
juvenile-specific irreparable corruption determination. That requirement
is mentioned nowhere in Lewis or in the sentencing statute. In this
conclusion, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else, the supreme court
analyzed the specific requirements for sentencing children through a lens
created for adult defendants, again ignoring the benefits to which
juveniles are entitled when being sentenced to LWOP.
Moreover, the court determined that because irreparable corruption is
a finding required by the Constitution, not a statute, jurisprudence
regulating maximum sentencing simply does not apply to juvenile
LWOP. 115 The court noted that Supreme Court Sixth Amendment 116
cases were based on state statutes that “authorized a maximum sentence
and also specifically required a judge to make an additional factfinding—
apart from the jury’s verdict—to authorize imposition of that maximum
sentence.” 117 But Georgia’s murder sentencing statute, O.C.G.A.

Id. at 267–68, 845 S.E.2d at 621.
Id. at 11, 845 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Lewis v. State, 301 Ga. 759, 767, 804 S.E.2d 82,
89 (2017)).
113 Lewis v. State, 301 Ga. 759, 804 S.E.2d 82 (2017).
114 See id. at 766–67, 804 S.E.2d at 89 (discussing LWOP for the adult defendant with
no reference to the special treatment to which minors are entitled).
115 Raines, 309 Ga. at 265, 845 S.E.2d at 619.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
117 Raines, 309 Ga. at 265, 845 S.E.2d at 619.
111
112
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§ 16-5-1, 118 does not require a finding of irreparable corruption or
permanent incorrigibility. In fact, the statute, which refers to and
authorizes the death penalty, does not mention juveniles at all. 119 It is
the Constitution that bars the State of Georgia from executing minors
and requires “that a specific determination of irreparable corruption be
made before imposing” LWOP on a juvenile. 120 The Eighth Amendment,
not the Sixth Amendment, requires juveniles be determined irreparably
corrupt before they may be sentenced to life without parole. Thus, the
state supreme court held that Eighth Amendment cases defining how
juveniles may be sentenced to LWOP have no bearing on who the Sixth
Amendment authorizes to do the sentencing. 121
Along the same lines, the court determined that juvenile life without
parole is not an “enhanced” sentence simply because Miller and
Montgomery did not say that it was. 122 In supporting the conclusion that
juvenile LWOP is not an enhanced sentence for Eighth Amendment
purposes, the court primarily relied on Cabana v. Bullock, 123 which
determined that the Constitution does not require a jury to decide as a
matter of fact that “the defendant himself killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill” the victim to be eligible for the death penalty and that
a judge is competent to make that determination if permitted by state
statute. 124 Though Cabana is still the law, it has been overruled in part
(on other grounds), and the court in Raines relied primarily on other state
courts’ interpretations of the case rather than Supreme Court or circuits
of appeals’ commentary. 125 For those reasons, the court held that juvenile

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 (2020).
See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(e)(1) (“A person convicted of the offense of murder shall be
punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or imprisonment for life.”).
120 Raines, 309 Ga. at 265, 845 S.E.2d at 619.
121 Id. at 13, 845 S.E.2d at 620 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
precedents . . . do not speak to what punishment a state statute authorizes for a given
offense or whether the ‘facts reflected in the jury verdict alone’ would authorize a given
punishment under the state statute . . . .”) (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 602).
122 Id. at 266, 845 S.E.2d at 620 Raines argued that juvenile LWOP was an enhanced
sentence “because the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent has so greatly
restricted the availability of that sentence for juveniles . . . . But neither Miller nor
Montgomery’s Eighth Amendment analysis of juvenile LWOP characterized [it] as a
sentence that increases or aggravates the penalty a juvenile faces . . . .” Id.
123 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
124 Raines, 309 Ga. at 267, 845 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385–86).
125 See id. at 267, 845 S.E.2d at 620–21 (citing People v. Blackwell, 3 Cal. App. 5th 166,
194 (2016) for the assertion that the Supreme Court has yet to “explicitly” overrule
Cabana’s Eighth Amendment holding and People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 309 n.17
(Mich. 2018) for a holding similar to the Raines conclusion.).
118
119
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LWOP is not an enhanced sentence and that minor defendants are not
entitled to be sentenced by a jury on that count. 126
B. Judges May Impose the Extraordinary Sentence of Juvenile LWOP
via Ordinary Procedures
Finally, Raines argued that the irreparable corruption determination
was a “‘fact’ that ‘expose[d] the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’” and thus must be found by a
jury pursuant to Veal II. 127 However, the Georgia Supreme Court noted
that, in Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court used the inclusive phrase “judge
or jury” rather than exclusively referring to a jury. 128 Furthermore, in
White, the state supreme court noted that the irreparable corruption
determination was never defined as a factual finding reserved for
juries. 129 Rather, the irreparable corruption conclusion is a “specific
determination” outside the realm of factfinding per se. 130
The court analyzed the issue further in terms of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 131 a United States Supreme Court case that determined judges
cannot sentence criminal defendants in excess of the maximum penalty
the defendant would have received if he were punished according to the
facts presented to his jury. 132 Though “a jury must find the aggravating
circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible,” a defendant is
not entitled to be sentenced by the jury. 133 Rather, once the jury has
found facts that permit a defendant to be sentenced to death, a judge can
use those facts to “weigh” culpability and determine whether execution
is appropriate. 134 Using this standard, the Georgia Supreme Court
decided in Raines that irreparable corruption is not designated to a jury
because Apprendi’s guidelines only apply to “legislative attempt[s] to
remove from the . . . jury the determination of facts that warrant

Id. at 267–28, 845 S.E.2d at 621.
Id. at 268, 845 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494
(2000)).
128 Id. at 269, 845 S.E.2d at 622 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 489).
129 Id. at 268, 845 S.E.2d at 621.
130 Id.
131 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
132 Id. at 483–84 (“[P]ractice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding
the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and
proving those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.”). That is, a sentencing judge may not review
facts in addition to those presented to the jury in order to make an additional determination
regarding culpability and then sentence the defendant based on that additional finding. Id.
133 McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020).
134 Id.
126
127
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punishment for a specific statutory offense.” 135 Informed by subsequent
Supreme Court rulings, the court decided to apply Apprendi only to
“statutorily prescribed factfindings,” not constitutionally required
findings such as irreparable corruption. 136 For this reason, the court held
the corruption determination is appropriately made by judges even if it
were a finding of fact for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 137
The Georgia Supreme Court’s decisions regarding juvenile LWOP
unnecessarily narrow United States Supreme Court and Georgia
Supreme Court precedent and abandon the policies behind the limits on
juvenile life without parole. In addition to multiplying the inconsistencies
in juvenile LWOP sentencing, the supreme court’s jurisprudence leaves
the door open for time-consuming, expensive litigation regarding the
boundaries of the irreparable corruption standard.
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
A. The Irreparably Corrupt Standard is Unsustainable
First, the current standard for sentencing juveniles to LWOP makes
little sense. Determining a minor is irreparably corrupt quite literally
requires a sentencer to predict the child’s future—that the child cannot
and will not ever improve himself. Judges and juries clearly should not
engage in attempts at fortune-telling; such predictions are absurd at face
value. As the sentencing court noted when sentencing Dakota White to
life with the possibility of parole, attempts at predicting the moral
development of a child are “based on predictions that ‘simply cannot be
made.’” 138 Not only does the irreparable corruption standard require the
judge or jury to predict the future, but it requires them to accurately
predict the moral development of someone who by definition lacks a fully
developed brain. 139 That lack of development is precisely why children
are entitled to the sentencer’s additional decision regarding irreparable
corruption.
The irreparable corruption standard requires sentencers to foretell the
emotional and psychological development of a child—a determination far
beyond the specialties of judges and juries. A finding of irreparable
corruption is akin to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, which
is a mental health diagnosis considered long-term and characterized by
135 Raines, 309 Ga. at 262, 845 S.E.2d at 623 (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 170
(2009)) (emphasis in Raines).
136 Id. at 271, 845 S.E.2d at 623.
137 Id. at 271–72, 845 S.E.2d at 623–24.
138 White, 307 Ga. at 605, 837 S.E.2d at 843.
139 Rachel Tompa, This is your brain on adolescence, BERKELEY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2008),
https://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2008/10/16_neurolaw.shtml.
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violent, deceitful, irresponsible behavior. 140 But even psychiatrists do not
diagnose children with such a stigmatized, permanent condition. 141 This
is not because psychiatrists cannot name and define symptoms of the
personality disorder in children but because the diagnosis requires an
evaluation of long-term behavior, and those patterns of behavior cannot
reliably be tracked over the course of fewer than eighteen years. 142 Even
a trained mental health professional cannot say how a
seventeen-year-old will interact with the world when he is twenty-seven,
much less seventy-seven. If psychiatrists cannot predict the development
from a child, including an older teenager, how can a judge?
Second, the irreparable corruption standard almost certainly cannot
be applied uniformly among different juvenile defendants. There are no
guidelines for what judges must assess to determine permanent
corruption; both supreme courts have just listed suggestions. 143 It stands
to reason that what represents irreparable corruption to one judge (or
jury) indicates the “transient immaturity” of youth to another. 144 Trial
courts are highly competent and entrusted with wide discretion in many
instances, but the imposition of a vague standard that requires judges to
act as a juvenile’s psychiatrist should not be one of those instances.
Finally, though most judges would surely make the painstaking
fact-finding necessary to evaluate a juvenile’s history, as the sentencing
judge in White did, it is likely not every judge will be so circumspect. 145
Though judges must have the discretion to consider the juvenile’s history
140 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, 659 (5th ed. 2013). Antisocial personality disorder is an appropriate
diagnosis for individuals over the age of eighteen who have, since at least the age of fifteen,
engaged in lawbreaking, deceitful, impulsive, aggressive behavior. Id. A hallmark of the
diagnosis is a lack of remorse for having hurt others. Id.
141 Id. (“For this diagnosis to be given, the individual must be at least [eighteen] years.”).
142 Id. at 647–48.
143 “Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics,” but there is no definition of what qualify as “attendant characteristics.”
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. The Court in Montgomery cited Miller’s discussion of
children’s physical and psychological vulnerabilities and immaturity as reasons why LWOP
is inappropriate without additional determinations, but the Court did not require
sentencers to actually examine a child’s homelife or specify anything that could indicate
“irretrievable depravity.” Id. at 733 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 471). Similarly, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Veal I acknowledged that the trial court’s general consideration of the
defendant’s “age and perhaps some of its associated characteristics, along with the overall
brutality of the crimes for which he was convicted” did not qualify as the “distinct
determination” of irreparable corruption Miller requires. Veal I, 298 Ga. at 703, 784 S.E.2d
at 412. The court did not indicate that the trial court need to any more than examine those
exact same features to potentially reach the conclusion that, based on that evidence alone,
Veal was irreparably corrupt. Id.
144 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
145 White, 307 Ga. at 605, 837 S.E.2d at 843.
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and “any other relevant circumstances,” neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the Georgia Supreme Court have given
straightforward guidance for what those considerations really look like.
White’s sentencing judge clearly met the standard, but what is the
minimum a judge could do to satisfy the consideration requirement? If a
judge makes a comparatively cursory analysis of a child’s age and the
circumstances of the crime and sentences the defendant to life without
parole based on that analysis, surely an appeal will follow. Then, the
Georgia Supreme Court will be tasked with interpreting its and the
United States Supreme Court’s juvenile LWOP jurisprudence yet again.
Bound by its interpretations of Miller and Montgomery, the court will
have to nitpick the facts of the case to decide on a secondary test to
determine whether the irreparable corruption standard has been
satisfied. Courts are not overly fond of sussing out facts like these, and
compounding the complications of the irreparable corruption standard
would not be ideal for either the State or any defendant.
This particular issue is not merely hypothetical. Both the United
States and Georgia supreme courts have recently been tasked with
determining what, exactly, qualifies as proof of irreparable corruption
and what specific procedural protections defendants are entitled to via
Montgomery’s retroactive application of Miller. In Love v. State, 146 the
Georgia Supreme Court reached the unsurprising conclusion that a
history of violent behavior coupled with a lack of remorse qualifies as
sufficient proof of irreparable corruption for a child to be sentenced to
LWOP. 147 The United States Supreme Court is currently deciding
whether an official determination of irreparable corruption is required or
whether a sentencer has the discretion to conclude a minor is, essentially,
bad enough to be LWOP-eligible with or without an official irreparable
corruption determination. 148
B. Alternatives to the Irreparable Corruption Standard
Since the irreparable corruption standard is untenable, there must be
other sentencing options for children who commit homicide. There are
2020 Ga. LEXIS 660.
Id. at 14–15. Equally unsurprisingly, the court declined to declare juvenile LWOP
out of step with “evolving standards of decency” and thus violative of the Eighth
Amendment or any other law. Id. at 18–19.
148 In Jones v. Mississippi, the State of Mississippi recently argued that a sentencer may
impose LWOP after considering youth and its attendant characteristics whether or not the
sentencer makes an explicit finding of irreparable corruption. Brief for Respondent, Jones
v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (U.S. August 14, 2020), 2020 U.S. S. CT. Brief LEXIS 6555, at
*3–4. Jones, the juvenile imprisoned for life without that technical finding, argued the
explicit determination is required. Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259
(U.S. June 5, 2020), 2020 U.S. S. CT. Briefs LEXIS 4800, at *2.
146
147
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two primary solutions: (1) banning life without parole for children or (2)
creating a viable standard under which juveniles may be sentenced to
LWOP.
1. Acknowledging the Writing on the Wall: Ending LWOP for
Georgia’s Children
The easiest—and cheapest—solution to these issues would be for the
Georgia General Assembly to rewrite the life without parole section of
the Georgia Code and take juvenile LWOP off the table. That would save
judges, juries, lawyers, defendants, and academics quite a few headaches
caused by untangling the current standards. It would relieve the State of
the cost of providing room, board, and medical care for people from the
age of seventeen to seventy, eighty, or even ninety. 149 This solution would
render obsolete the policy and statutory interpretation schisms the
supreme court introduced in Veal II and Raines. Without the power to
imprison children for life, there would be no need to quibble over what
rights children have in LWOP sentencing procedures.
a. Abolishing juvenile LWOP would empower Georgia
lawmakers and conform with the rest of the Georgia Code
Statutorily banning juvenile life without parole would empower
Georgia to reach its own conclusions as to what alternatives to life
without parole are most appropriate before the United States Supreme
Court eventually, inevitably, removes juvenile LWOP from the states’
ability to sentence. Though the Court is currently in a state of political
flux, and several justices are certainly not pro-criminal justice reform, 150
it is reasonable to suppose that the Court will eventually outlaw a
penalty that the rest of the world has already abolished. 151
Indeed, the Supreme Court banning LWOP is precisely what Chief
Justice Roberts warned the American people of in his Miller dissent. 152
No matter the outcome of the case currently before the Court, the
apparent trajectory of the Court remains the same: harsh sentences for

149 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW, 4 (Feb.
2020) https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/.
150 Justices Thomas, Alito, and Roberts all dissented from the Miller majority’s
conclusions that children should be protected from the harshest sentences available. Miller,
567 U.S. at 493 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
151 JUVENILE LAW CENTER, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (JLWOP), 2020,
https://jlc.org/issues/juvenile-life-without-parole.
152 Miller, 567 U.S. at 501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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juveniles are increasingly unpopular at home 153 and abroad. 154 It is only
a matter of time before the Court decides the United States will no longer
“stand[] alone in a world that has turned its face” on a punishment
directly comparable to the death sentence. 155
Georgia sentencing for juveniles, especially when the stakes are high,
should be consistent with the rest of Constitutional law and the Official
Code of Georgia, where children are treated differently than adults
throughout. If the General Assembly wants to beat the Supreme Court
to the punch and decide on its own what to do with juveniles convicted of
homicide, it could easily bring juvenile sentencing in line with the way
the Georgia Code already treats juveniles.
Georgia law already acknowledges that juveniles cannot realistically
be held responsible for their decisions in the same way adults are. It is
illegal to sell firearms to individuals under the age of twenty-one. 156 The
Georgia Code strictly regulates when and with whom teenagers may
drive vehicles, and teenagers are completely barred from obtaining some
licenses until they are at least seventeen and satisfy multiple other
qualifications. 157 Anyone who wishes to buy a lottery ticket must be over
eighteen. 158 Georgians cannot get married under the age of eighteen
without parental consent. 159 It is illegal for even an adult to buy alcohol
for a minor. 160 Children under eighteen cannot so much as buy fireworks
for the Fourth of July. 161 These laws are all designed to protect the public
from teenagers or teenagers from themselves. If we know children (even
ones who are almost adults) are not responsible enough to buy lottery
tickets, cannot be trusted to drive safely, and are too immature to buy
fireworks, we cannot honestly believe those very same children have the

153 This Article chronicles the Supreme Court’s progression regarding juvenile justice,
from Roper through Montgomery. Despite shifts in the Court’s makeup, it is sensible to
suppose that, over time, the Court will continue to lean in the same direction. It is
important to remember, however, that the Court is not impervious to public opinion—and
public increasingly favors reform, not strict punishment, for juvenile offenders. See PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, Public Attitudes on the Juvenile Justice System in Georgia, 1, 2, 4 (Feb.
3,
2013),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2013/03/05/public-attitudes-on-the-juvenile-justice-system-in-georgia
(Georgia
voters showed significant interest in and support for placing juveniles on parole rather than
prison for various crimes and shortening incarceration periods).
154 See JUVENILE LAW CENTER, supra note 151.
155 Roper 543, U.S. at 557.
156 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)(2)(A) (2020).
157 O.C.G.A. § 40-5-24(a)(1)(A), (B) (2020).
158 O.C.G.A. § 50-27-26 (2020).
159 O.C.G.A. § 19-3-2(a)(2), (b) (2020).
160 O.C.G.A. § 3-3-23(a)(1) (2020).
161 O.C.G.A.§ 25-10-2(b)(1) (2020).
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capacity to assess decisions, even criminal ones, just as their adult
counterparts.
Beyond the irreparable corruption standard itself, the legislature
could redefine who is eligible for life without parole. This could at least
limit the number of times sentencers must invest time and energy into
deciding whether a child is irreparably evil. Right now, anyone who
commits homicide is eligible for LWOP under Georgia law, but the
legislature could modify the Georgia Code so minors without criminal
histories are ineligible for LWOP. This would fit nicely within the rest of
the Georgia Code, as the legislature has already provided that some first
offenders are entitled to special sentencing structures. 162 The standard
first offender statute already on the books would not apply to minors
eligible for LWOP because it does not apply to felonies, 163 but the
legislature could make an exception (or an additional part of the Code)
for juveniles whose homicide conviction is their first offense.
b. Banning juvenile life without parole reflects public
consensus on juvenile sentencing
Eliminating juvenile life without parole is well within the common
thinking on juvenile sentencing. Many polls regarding juvenile justice
reform focus on perpetrators of non-violent crimes or misdemeanors, but
not all the available data has such a focus. Americans—registered
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents—widely believe that the
criminal justice system should treat children differently than adults. 164
Those same voters overwhelmingly believe that juvenile justice should be
focused on rehabilitative efforts, not exclusively punishment. 165 Less
than a quarter of Americans believe that the justice system should
imprison children to protect the public (as opposed to incarceration
serving as rehabilitation), and even fewer believe in a system that
punishes children for the sake of punishment alone. 166 Though criminal
justice reforms are often met with tough-on-crime defenses, public
feedback remains the same: Americans, like the rest of the world, would
rather see systems help children rather than hurt them. 167
Reflecting these voter preferences, many states have revised their
statutes to conform with this progress in public opinion. As of 2020,
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have banned juvenile
O.C.G.A. § 40-8-60(a) (2020).
Id.
164 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Public Opinion on Juvenile Justice in America (Nov. 2014),
2, https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/pspp_juvenile_poll_web.pdf.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
162
163
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LWOP entirely. 168 Another six states technically permit the judges or
juries to sentence minors to life without parole but have no children
serving such sentences. 169 That leaves Georgia, with two teenagers
serving LWOP sentences and an unknown number of adults finishing life
sentences for crimes committed when they were children, with more
prisoners in such a position than nearly half of the other states combined.
The many states that have banned juvenile LWOP reflect a broader
international standard: every other nation in the world has abolished
juvenile life without parole. 170 Not only has every other country on Earth
banned juvenile LWOP, but sentencing juveniles to life in prison actually
violates international human rights conventions. 171 Unsurprisingly, the
United States did not ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 172
the declaration that protects other nations’ children from LWOP. 173 Only
three other nations failed to ratify the Rights of the Child convention,
and of those three the United States stands alone in not even stating an
intention to become a signatory. 174 With America’s international
reputation dissolving into near non-existence over time, our lonely stance
on juvenile life without parole only confirms the international perception
of the United States’ status as a harsh, backwater wasteland. 175

168 The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, States That Ban Life Without Parole
for Children, (Feb. 24, 2020), https://fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/statesthat-ban-life/. These are not all states known for being particularly progressive and include
Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, and Texas. Id.
169 Id.
170 JUVENILE LAW CENTER, supra note 151.
171 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (Sept. 2, 1990), Article 37(a) (“No child shall be
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be
imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”).
172 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (Sept. 2, 1990).
173 Human Rights Watch, 25th Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Nov 17, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/25th-anniversary-convention-rightschild#.
174 Id.
175 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country
Has
Handled
Coronavirus
Badly,
3,
8
(Sep.
15,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-asmost-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly/ (specifically noting the world’s view of
the United States’ response to the Covid-19 pandemic and lack of faith in the U.S.’s
handling of racial justice issues).
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2. Creating an Alternative, Functional Standard for
Sentencing Minors to LWOP
If Georgia insists on sentencing juveniles to serve life without the
possibility of parole, it must do so within the parameters the Supreme
Court has already set. The legislature cannot invent a standard lower
than the irreparable corruption requirement. It can, however, more
accurately define what irreparable corruption means in the State of
Georgia and use precedent from both the United States Supreme Court
and Georgia Supreme Court as guides.
So, what could the legislature require courts to consider when
sentencing minors to serve life without parole? First, the statute
permitting juveniles to be sentenced to life without parole could be
amended to fit the requirements the Supreme Court has already set. The
legislature could require sentencers to review all the circumstances of a
crime—both mitigating and prejudicial to the defendant. An examination
of the minor’s home and educational environments could quickly
illuminate whether a child’s behavior indicates antisocial leanings or
whether it is more directly tied to the child’s personal experiences.
Under Miller, judges currently “must have the discretion to consider
‘youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his
crime.’” 176 Under Veal I, judges must use that discretion to end up with
a decision that the minor is or is not irreparably corrupt. 177 But the Miller
Court’s mandate to consider “youth and its attendant characteristics” is
vague, and neither of the supreme courts have defined what “attendant
characteristics” of youth are really relevant. 178 This may be out of
deference to lower courts’ ability to decide what is and is not relevant,
but if the Georgia legislature establishes a uniform application of a
standard, it would be useful to begin by defining at least some of the
circumstances that must or can be assessed into before sentencing.
The legislature could require courts to examine factors such as: the
defendant’s and victim’s relative ages and relationship; the mental and
emotional development of the defendant; whether the defendant was
particularly prone to experience peer pressure and if that affected his
decision-making regarding the crime; whether he acted alone or in
concert with others; whether he had witnessed or participated in violent
acts before (criminal or not); and any indication of remorse or lack
thereof.
Focusing on the crime itself, the legislature could require courts to look
at the level of planning the murder took. In addition to the time and effort
(or lack thereof) the defendant spent planning the crime, sentencers
Id., 307 Ga. at 604, 837 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465).
298 Ga. at 702, 784 S.E.2d at 411.
178 Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
176
177
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should also consider the pain the defendant (1) planned to inflict on the
victim and (2) actually did inflict. These factors could be useful for a
psychiatric assessment of the defendant, but the sentencing entity should
consider them outside of that context as well.
Regarding the child’s personality, the legislature could require courts
to commission a third-party psychiatric analysis. The analysis could
determine whether the child exhibits antisocial behavior that indicates
an unwillingness or inability to be reformed. There is no need for an
actual diagnosis, but an evaluation with written conclusions could go far
in determining whether the child is distressed and angry, otherwise
mentally unwell, or actively hostile to attempts at helping him reenter
society. Much of this analysis could and should focus on the child’s ability
to empathize with others or experience remorse rather than speculating
about his likelihood to experience those emotions.
The legislature could, of course, include the great legal catch-all:
sentencing entities can and should include anything else they deem
relevant. After all these determinations and evaluations, the judge could
still very well sentence the juvenile to serve life in prison. But at least
the defense counsel, the prosecutor, the judge, and most importantly the
defendant, would know the steps involved in the process no matter who
or where the sentencer is.
None of these issues need be determinative of the issue, and this is
still far from a perfect standard. It would not render entirely uniform
results for similar crimes committed under similar circumstances, but it
would come closer than the existing test. This proposed test simply
affords juveniles a tailored sentencing scheme that accommodates their
constitutional and human rights.
Assessing the required factors would also give the justice system and
sentencers a little more security in the permanence of a sentence. Minors
convicted under this suggested standard would (and should) still appeal
their convictions on every possible issue, but if a sentencing judge has
followed the required procedures, the court would have a better chance
of its determination being upheld than if the court were stuck deciding
for itself what does and does not count as necessary evidence.
These proposed considerations do not, however, solve the moral
problem with sentencing children for life based on the worst thing they
have ever done. Really, adults who have spent years, decades, in prison
should not be bound by psychiatric or judicial evaluations of their
character when they were teenagers. But if the State of Georgia will
imprison children for their whole adult lives, the government should be
clearer about what to expect in the sentencing process and must ensure
that such extreme sentences are actually protecting society, not infinitely
punishing a single action simply because the government can.
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Entitling children to more procedural precautions than adults is
complicated and time-consuming, but that is often the cost of
administering true justice. It makes little sense for the considerations
outlined in Miller to be limited to the defendant’s receiving a LWOP
sentence and not applied to the procedural aspects of handing down that
sentence (such as judge versus jury, preponderance versus beyond
reasonable doubt, or de facto LWOP). If children are entitled to specific
consideration in being sentenced to LWOP (and they are), those children
should be entitled to tailored procedural guidelines as well. This higher
standard for the justice system is more difficult to administer, but it is
the adults’ job to ensure that a child is not punished beyond his capacity
to understand. 179
VI. CONCLUSION
Juvenile life without parole poses many functional and ethical
problems to consider, but no discussion should overlook the absurdity of
the issue itself. The United States is the only country in the world that
allows children to be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 180
This means that the State of Georgia, with “only” two people who are still
children serving sentences without the possibility of parole, still has
100% more children in such a position than all of the other continents
combined. At the end of the day, the procedures required for the State to
punish children more severely than is permitted in any other place on
the globe can never be strict enough. Procedure cannot rationalize
allowing judges or juries to diagnose personality defects in people so
young psychiatrists cannot make such diagnoses—or punishing
seventy-year-old men for the sins they committed when they were
seventeen.
For now, juvenile homicide defendants have at least some procedural
elements on their side. As a rule, and especially regarding children, what
procedures exist should be used in as uniform and sensible ways possible.
That makes it harder for all the adults involved in the convicting process,
but that is a burden we should gladly bear to protect Georgia’s children
179 In sum, the procedures regarding sentencing children to life in prison should reflect
the stringency of the irreparable corruption standard. One may argue that, by decreasing
the number of children sentenced to LWOP over time, the irreparable corruption standard
has accomplished its purpose and that Georgia’s children need no more protection from the
State. But that answers the wrong question. When it comes to juveniles’ sentencing rights
under the constitution, the proper question is not “What must we do to decrease the number
of children in our LWOP system?” but “What procedural safeguards is each child convicted
of homicide entitled to?” And if each child is entitled to a determination of irreparable
corruption, each child is logically entitled to surrounding procedures that serve the policy
purposes of the irreparable corruption standard.
180 JUVENILE LAW CENTER, supra note 151.
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from our own preoccupation with punishment. It only makes sense to
treat juveniles facing sentences to life without parole as they would be
treated under many other provisions of the Georgia Code—differently
than their adult counterparts, accounting for children’s inherent
inability to plan for the future as effectively as adults.
In the absence of United States Supreme Court precedent, Georgia
Supreme Court law, or a statute protecting Georgia’s juveniles from the
complex, unpredictable standards of constitutional law, the current
position of juvenile life without the possibility of parole may appear
bleak. However, it bears remembering that children are more protected
from extreme punishments now than ever before in the history of the
United States. Until 2005, the United States Constitution permitted the
execution of individuals for crimes committed when they were teenagers.
Shortly after protecting juveniles from the death penalty, the Supreme
Court limited how and when the government can sentence children to
live and die in prison. No matter what steps the Court takes regarding
juvenile LWOP, in this term or the next, it appears unlikely that the case
establishing particular sentencing protections for children, Roper, will be
overturned or limited beyond recognition. For now, Dr. Martin Luthor
King Jr.’s oft-quoted notion remains apt: “[T]he arc of the moral universe
is long, but it bends toward justice.” 181

Rachel Ness-Maddox

181 Dr. Martin Luthor King Jr., Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution (March
31, 1968).

